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The fields of bioethics and law are inextricably entangled. Many
of the toughest and most controversial issues in bioethics-abor-
tion, surrogacy, control of frozen embryos, removal of life-support
systems, physician-assisted death-end up being resolved, for bet-
ter or worse, in the courts. The other branches of government are
involved as well-legislatures pass laws, administrative agencies is-
sue regulations, and presidents convene commissions and make
funding decisions.
Wherever there is law, there are lawyers. When we think of law-
yers and bioethics, we usually think of packed courtrooms and con-
tentious litigation, but lawyers are more often involved behind the
scenes, counseling clients who are facing life and death medical de-
cisions. Counseling clients who want to execute a will or advanced
directive; counseling clients who hope to adopt a baby; counseling
clients who are worried about an elderly relative who has grown
feeble and irrational; counseling clients whose child was born with
Down's Syndrome and needs stomach surgery to survive; counsel-
ing a client whose mother is in a persistent vegetative state, and is
being kept alive by artificial nutrition and hydration; counseling
hospitals, nursing homes, and hospices on individual cases and in-
stitutional policies; counseling legislators and administrative agen-
cies on what laws to write, and which regulations to issue. We
rarely pause and consider this role of the lawyer.
While legal literature contains thousands of articles on bioethics
and law, there are few works that examine the dynamics of the
lawyer-client relationship. Scholars studying the intersection of
law and medicine often ignore the context in which the two disci-
plines converge daily in countless offices around the country-with
lawyer and client sitting together, talking, wrestling with tough
choices, deciding what and what not to do.
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B.A., Colgate University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977; M.Div;, Yale Divin-
ity School, 1989. The Author was formerly the A.A. and Ethel Yossem Professor of
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This conference represents an important step in remedying that
oversight. Yet it seeks to do more than merely examine the inter-
actions between lawyer and client. It adds yet another element to
what is already a complex picture-religion. This conference fo-
cuses not only on the role of the lawyer in bioethics, but also on the
relevance of religion to the lawyer's work. This conference can
thus be seen as the natural outgrowth of several other symposia
hosted by Fordham Law School that have examined the relation-
ship between religion and lawyering. 1
Law, Bioethics, and Religion. Three academic disciplines.
Three spheres of life. How do they come together in the lawyer-
client relationship? How do they overlap, intersect, and interpene-
trate? More specifically, what role should a lawyer's religion play
in her relationships with clients? Should religion be part of the
conversation between a lawyer and her client? What if a lawyer
has religious objections to a course of action that appears to be in
her client's best interests? Should the lawyer voice her objections,
or stay silent?
As we deal with these issues, keep in mind the simple image of a
lawyer and client, sitting together, talking, wrestling with tough
choices. Let us consider two questions. First, how should we envi-
sion the relationship between a lawyer and her client? Second,
what role should the lawyer's religion play in that relationship?
I. THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Hypothetical
My grandmother died a few years ago. At one point our family
discussed the possibility of a feeding tube for my grandmother, but
she died before we could make a decision. For the purposes of
analysis, assume my grandmother has been comatose, on a ventila-
tor and feeding tube for months, with no reasonable chance of re-
covery.' Assume further that my grandmother has left no living
will or other indication of her wishes about life-supports. Under
1. E.g., Dialogue on the Practice of Law and Spiritual Values, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 991 (2001); Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the Lives of Law-
yers and Those They Represent, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium, The
Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1075 (1988). Another important source for those interested in exploring the
religious dimensions of legal practice is Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 TEXAS
TECH L. REV. 911 (1996).
2. This hypothetical is admittedly unrealistic, however, it is not being used to
examine the intricacies of the law of death and dying, but to explore the various ways
lawyers relate to clients. For our purposes, the simplicity of the hypothetical is useful,
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these circumstances, the law of our state allows the next-of-kin to
make the decision. I am my grandmother's closest living relative.
In my discussions with the nursing home, I have raised the possi-
bility of removing the life-supports, but have been told to wait a
few more months before making a decision. Not sure of what to
do, I decide to see a lawyer to learn more about my options.
Assume I visit three lawyers. The first listens to me for a minute
or two, and then interrupts. She tells me that under the law of our
state I can have the life-supports withdrawn. If the nursing home
refuses, I can get a court order requiring removal. "Look," she
says, "here's what we'll do. I'll call the nursing home immediately
and demand they withdraw the life-supports. If they say no, we'll
go to court." She pauses for a moment, as if awaiting my approval.
"I'm not sure," I say, "It seems OK, but I'm still not sure what to
do." The lawyer explains that she's seen a lot of these cases, and
that withdrawing the life-supports is the right thing to do. "You're
too emotionally involved to make the decision," she tells me.
"That's what I'm here for. Leave everything to me." I tell her I'll
think about it and get back to her tomorrow.
I go to a second lawyer, who listens intently to what I say. She
nods understandingly. When I am finished, she says, "We have
several options open to us. It all depends on what you want. We
could wait awhile, we could schedule a meeting with the nursing
home, or we could go to court. It's really your choice." I try to
explain that I'm not sure what to do. "A part of me thinks it's right
to remove my grandmother from life-support, but another part of
me thinks it's wrong, almost like murder." The lawyer tells me to
think some more about what I want to do, make a decision, and
then get back to her. "Whatever you want to do, we can do," she
tells me as I leave.
I go to a third and final lawyer, and tell my story again. This
lawyer does not tell me what to do. She does not promise to do
whatever I tell her to do. She listens to me, asks questions, and
identifies options. We are drawn into a discussion of the moral is-
sues surrounding the use and removal of life-supports. As I be-
come more comfortable with her, I reveal that I have religious
concerns about removing the life-supports. The lawyer suggests I
meet with my parish priest to talk about the religious issues. She
says she will arrange a meeting with my grandmother's physician
and the administrator of the nursing home. Perhaps then, we will
as it allows us to draw clear distinctions between different models of the lawyer-client
relationship.
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find out what we need to know to make an informed and wise deci-
sion. I leave, still not knowing what to do, but feeling surprisingly
better.
These crude portraits are unreal, of course, and simplify both the
dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship, as well as the proce-
dures involved. These hypothetical scenarios are meant to high-
light several typical models of legal counseling currently prevalent
in the profession. Each of my hypothetical lawyers represents a
distinctive orientation or perspective on the lawyer-client relation-
ship. They are roughly based on models developed by law profes-
sors Robert Cochran, John DiPippa, and Martha Peters in their
important work, The Counselor-at-Law: A Collaborative Approach
to Client Interviewing and Counseling.3 The authors identify three
models of lawyer-client relationships: authoritarian, client-cen-
tered, and collaborative.4 Each model will be examined in turn.
1. The Authoritarian Model
The authoritarian model, exemplified by the first lawyer in our
hypothetical, presumes that the lawyer is in charge of the relation-
ship.5 Clients are expected to be docile and passive. They should
trust their lawyers to act in their best interests. They should not
ask too many questions or take too active a role on their own be-
half. In contrast, lawyers are expected to be aggressive, decisive,
and commanding. In his famous study of lawyers and clients,
David Rosenthal calls this the "traditional approach."6 Rosenthal
concludes, "The traditional idea is that both parties are best served
by the professional's assuming broad control over solutions to the
problems brought by the client."7
The reasons for such a model are not difficult to understand.8
As I have written elsewhere, "Clients are often vulnerable, troub-
led persons. They frequently lack an understanding of the lan-
guage or the nuances of the law. They are strangers in the strange
land of the courts. They have little choice but to trust in the com-
3. ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAw: A COLLABORA-
TIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 2-4.
6. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 7-13
(1974).
7. Id. at 7.
8. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 52-60; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 15-24 (1975).
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petence of their lawyer."9 Add to this that lawyers have undergone
a socialization process that leads many to see themselves as "mem-
bers of an elite ... different from and somewhat better" than the
clients they are hired to serve.10
When these factors are present, it becomes easy for a lawyer to
act paternalistically towards a client and deal with her not as an
adult, but as a child, or perhaps, as a broken object needing to be
fixed.1 The lawyer is tempted to treat her client "as though the
client were an individual who needed to be looked after and con-
trolled, and to have decisions made for him or her by the lawyer,
with as little interference from the client as possible.' 12
Cochran identifies four problems with the authoritarian ap-
proach. 13 First, it disregards the client's dignity. 4 The client
should be in charge of the important decisions about her life, not
the lawyer. Second, it is likely to be less satisfying for clients "be-
cause clients, in general, are likely to be the best judges of their
own interests."1 5 Only the client knows her own values, goals, and
willingness to take risks. Third, client control is likely to achieve
better monetary results than the authoritarian model. Cochran
notes that Rosenthal's study found that "plaintiffs who are actively
involved in their cases obtain higher settlements and higher ver-
dicts than plaintiffs who allow their lawyers to control the repre-
sentation."' 6 Fourth, the authoritarian model is contrary to the
thrust of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which give the
client the ultimate authority to decide the objectives of the
representation. 7
There are other problems with this approach. Under the author-
itarian model, client problems are viewed as legal problems for
which the lawyer provides legal solutions. 18 As a result, it is un-
9. Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant.: A Religious Perspective on
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1111-12 (1998) [hereinafter
Allegretti, Religious Perspective].
10. Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 18.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 22.
13. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3-4 (citing ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 36-46).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983); COCHRAN ET AL., supra
note 3, at 4. As the Comment to Rule 1.2 states, "The client has ultimate authority to
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits im-
posed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt [1].
18. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
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likely that the parties will engage in a full and frank discussion of
the moral issues involved with the representation. Feelings, emo-
tions, morals, religious values, concerns for third parties-all seem
irrelevant. There is little incentive to raise moral issues if the law-
yer views the client as a child, rather than an adult. The client may
feel as if her own moral doubts or concerns cannot be voiced, and
the lawyer may bracket her own moral values and come to see her-
self not as a moral agent but as a moral neuter-in Richard Was-
serstrom's felicitous phrase, an "amoral technician"19-whose
work is divorced from the rest of her life, including her deepest
values and religious commitments.
Of course, not all lawyers adopt the authoritarian approach.
Many sophisticated clients, particularly businesspersons, possess a
certain legal savvy that allows them to meet their lawyers as
equals.20 Another obvious fact that may be easily overlooked is:
"[P]rivate practitioners depend wholly on their clients for their
livelihood, and this dependence is fundamental in the distribution
of power."'" In some cases, an authoritarian client may dominate
and control her lawyer.
Even if the authoritarian model is less likely to exist in the cor-
porate context, it may be common among lawyers who practice di-
vorce law, elder law, or bioethics law. Lawyers in these fields often
deal with clients who struggle with agonizing decisions about life
and death issues. Their clients are emotionally vulnerable, and
sometimes cognitively impaired. Many of their clients have never
been to a lawyer before, and find it difficult to make decisions or
verbally express their wishes. Additionally, many clients are more
than willing to defer to a lawyer, if only to have someone else take
up the heavy burdens they have been carrying. I suspect that the
authoritarian model, even with all the criticism it engenders, 22 is
alive and well in the areas of family law and bioethics law.
19. Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 5-6.
20. See DEBORAH L. RHODE ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS 610 (1st ed. 1992) ("One
might wonder, however, whether... worries about power asymmetries are appropri-
ate in cases involving sophisticated business clients rather than divorce or legal aid
clients, particularly since corporate managers often use their own in-house counsel to
direct and control outside attorneys.").
21. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tionship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1036-37 (1990).
22. For additional criticisms of the authoritarian model, see David Luban, Pater-
nalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454; Simon, supra note 8, at 52-60;
Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 15-24.
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2. The Client-Centered Model
In response to the criticisms directed at the authoritarian model,
a second model has developed, illustrated by the second lawyer in
my hypothetical. Cochran calls this the "client-centered model. 23
He dates its emergence to the 1977 publication of David Binder
and Susan Price's book, Legal Interviewing and Counseling.24 As
its name suggests, this model places client autonomy at the
forefront.
Binder and Price urge lawyers to expand their view of the cli-
ent's "case" to include nonlegal aspects. The lawyer's role "in-
volves having clients actively participate in identifying their
problems, formulating potential solutions and making decisions.
Thus, client-centered lawyering emanates from a belief in the
autonomy, intelligence, dignity, and basic morality of the indi-
vidual client." Lawyers are asked to convey "empathic under-
standing" to their clients. Lawyers invite clients to define the
goals of the case, to suggest alternatives to pursue those goals,
and to make decisions to advance the case. In client centered-
counseling, the lawyer must maintain an appearance of neutral-
ity and refrain from providing direct advice. Whereas the client
has a very limited role in the authoritarian model, the lawyer
has a very limited role in the client-centered model.25
Although Cochran considers the client-centered model superior
to the authoritarian model, he points out several shortcomings.26
First, all decisions are made on the basis of what will maximize the
client's interest, leaving no room for the lawyer and client to dis-
cuss how the client's decisions might impact other people. 27 Sec-
ond, the client-centered model is a "one-size-fits-all approach. 28
It assumes that the client must make all important decisions for the
client, and ignores the possibility that a client might want her law-
yer to make certain decisions on her behalf. Third, the client-cen-
tered model overlooks the reality of legal practice; sometimes
clients come to lawyers only for "short-term help in resolving a
narrow issue. In such cases, the client-centered model is inflexi-
23. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-6 (citations ommitted).
24. DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). This book was later revised and up-
dated in DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED
APPROACH (1991).
25. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
26. Id. at 5-6.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 6.
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ble and time-consuming. Finally, the client-centered model may go
too far in its well-intentioned effort to avoid lawyer domination of
clients, as the lawyer may be reluctant to bring her own "practical
wisdom" to the lawyer-client relationship.30 As Cochran notes,
"Lawyers should be careful not to overpower clients, but they
should not deny to clients the primary thing that the client may
have come for: help in making decisions. '"31
The client-centered model substitutes one form of domination
for another, and when a client dominates the lawyer, the same
problems arise as when the lawyer dominates the client:
Once again there is not a relationship of equality in which the
two sides are open to the other. Once again moral issues are
bracketed. The lawyer is encouraged to ignore the moral conse-
quences of his actions and to do whatever the client wants as
long as the client is paying.32
Under these circumstances, the lawyer becomes a mere hired
gun, whose job is to shoot first and ask no questions at all.33 The
client's moral and religious values, like the lawyer's, have no place
in such a relationship.
While the authoritarian model provides too large a role for law-
yers, the client-centered model does just the opposite.34 An ap-
proach that respects the autonomy and human dignity of both
parties is needed. Cochran therefore proposes a third approach,
which he calls the "collaborative model."35
3. The Collaborative Model
Under the collaborative model, "the client would control deci-
sions, but the lawyer would structure the process and provide ad-
vice in a manner that is likely to yield wise decisions."36 Cochran
quotes David Rosenthal, who has urged lawyers and clients to
work towards "mutual participation in a cooperative relationship
in which the cooperating parties have relatively equal status, are
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JOSEPH ALLEGRETT-I, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL
PRACTICE 41(1996).
33. See Joseph Allegretti, Have Briefcase Will Travel: An Essay On The Lawyer As
Hired Gun, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 747, 749 (1991) [hereinafter Allegretti, Hired
Gun].
34. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-6.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
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equally dependent, and are engaged in activity 'that will be in some
ways satisfying to both [parties].' ",3
Cochran argues that the collaborative approach avoids the
problems of the authoritarian and client-centered models. As com-
pared to the authoritarian model, the collaborative model pro-
motes client dignity and yields better results.38 The collaborative
model is superior to the client-centered model as well, because it
encourages the client to consider not only her own self-interest, but
also the interests of others who might be affected by her deci-
sions.39 Since the collaborative model allows both parties to bring
their practical wisdom to bear upon problems, it is likely to lead to
better, more-informed decisions.4 °
Perhaps most importantly, the collaborative model allows law-
yers and clients to engage in a moral dialogue. The lawyer is not
the client's boss, but neither is she the client's hired gun. Each
party is empowered to raise moral concerns. Cochran suggests
analogizing the relationship between a lawyer and client to the re-
lationship between friends. 41 This does not mean, of course, that
lawyers must become friends with each and every client, but that
lawyers "might discuss moral issues with a client in the way that
they would discuss moral issues with a friend; not imposing their
values on the client, but exploring the client's moral values, and not
being afraid to influence the client."42
A collaborative relationship is like a friendship, as each party
maintains moral accountability for her own actions within a context
of mutual accountability to and for the other. Neither party is the
rubber stamp of the other. Cochran quotes Anthony Kronman,
who argues that a good lawyer, like a good friend, helps a client by
being both sympathetic and independent:
37. Id. at 7 (quoting ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 10).
38. Id. at 6-7.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 176-82; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAW-
YERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 40-54 (1994) (arguing for the lawyer-as-
friend analogy); Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 439, 455-59 (1990) (arguing that lawyers should deal with clients as they
would a good friend). Professor Charles Fried uses the analogy of the lawyer-as-friend
for a quite different purpose. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foun-
dations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1076-87 (1976) (arguing that
the lawyer-as-friend analogy explains why lawyers may do things for clients that ordi-
nary morality would condemn). For a sharp criticism of Fried, see Edward A. Dauer
& Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 575-80
(1976).
42. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 177.
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Friends take each other's interests seriously and wish to see
them advanced; it is part of the meaning of friendship that they
do. It does not follow, however, that friends always accept un-
critically each other's accounts of their own needs. Indeed,
friends often exercise a large degree of independent judgement
[sic] in assessing each other's interests, and the feeling that one
sometimes has an obligation to do so is also an important part of
what the relation of friendship means. What makes such inde-
pendence possible is the ability of friends to exercise greater de-
tachment when reflecting on each other's needs than they are
often able to achieve when reflecting on their own. A friend's
independence can be of immense value, and is frequently the
reason why one friend turns to another for advice. Friends of
course expect sympathy from each other: it is the expectation of
sympathy that distinguishes a friend from a stranger. But they
also want detachment, and those who lack either quality are
likely to be poor friends. a3
Thomas Morgan also employs the friendship analogy to explain
the lawyer-client relationship.44 When we go to a friend, we expect
"advice on what to do. We do not want to be preached at, and we
do not want to be manipulated. We would not consider ourselves
well advised, however, if our friends failed to consider the moral,
as well as any other dimensions of our problem. 45 Lawyers should
be free to give "the kind of candid, tough advice" that a friend
would give. 6
For some of us, the collaborative model and friendship analogy
are also grounded in religious values. Elsewhere I have examined
how a religious lawyer in general, or a Christian lawyer in particu-
lar, should approach the lawyer-client relationship. 7 Based upon
my reading of Scripture and my understanding of the Christian way
of life, I have proposed what I call a "covenantal model" of lawyer-
client relationships, in which each party recognizes the sacred
worth and moral equality of the other.4 8 Under this model, the
lawyer serves as a kind of moral companion to her client. Neither
43. Id. at 8 (quoting ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDE-
ALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 131-32 (1993)).
44. Morgan, supra note 41, at 455-59.
45. Id. at 458.
46. Id. at 459.
47. See Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1129; see also WILLIAM F.
MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHICS
(1983) (proposing a covenantal model of the doctor-patient relationships); see gener-
ally ALLEGRETTI, supra note 32.
48. ALLEGRETTI, supra note 32, at 37-50; Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra
note 9, at 1116-29.
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the client, nor the lawyer is in charge of the relationship, and
neither is obligated to ignore her own moral values.49 This leads
me to adopt the friendship analogy for fundamentally religious
reasons:
Lawyers and clients in covenant are not precisely the same as
good friends - we do not buy our friends with money - but they
are like friends in that each has made a commitment to be open
to and to learn from the other. One of the things I want from a
friend is a kindly ear, a willingness to listen and to withhold
hasty judgments.
But that is not all that I want. I also want honesty and moral
companionship from my friend. There are times when a friend,
a true friend, will say to me candidly, "Look, that doesn't sound
like you. Are you sure that's what you want to do?" A true
friend reminds me of the kind of person I aspire to be at my best
rather than blindly supporting whatever I choose to do at my
worst. In the same way, lawyers can serve as a voice calling cli-
ents back to their better selves, reminding clients of their deep-
est values, loves, and obligations. A lawyer can serve as a moral
guide or moral companion to her clients.5°
As an example of what this entails, consider a man who comes to
a lawyer with a complaint against his son.51 He is angry because of
his son's announcement that he and his girlfriend are going to have
49. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1124-27.
50. Id. at 1124-25 (citations omitted). I am not suggesting that the friendship be-
tween lawyers and clients is the same as the ideal of friendship developed by Aris-
totle, but there are similarities. Most importantly, both Aristotle's ideal of friendship
and the friendship model of lawyer-client relations agree on the importance of explor-
ing moral issues. As Robert Bellah explains:
For Aristotle and his successors, it was precisely the moral component of
friendship that made it the indispensable basis of a good society. For it is one
of the main duties of friends to help one another to be better persons: one
must hold up a standard for one's friend and be able to count on a true
friend to do likewise. Traditionally, the opposite of a friend is a flatterer,
who tells one what one wants to hear and fails to tell one the truth.
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 115 (1985). But see Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me:
Shaffer and Cochran's Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U.
ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 7-27 (1995) (criticizing the friendship model of lawyer-
client relations as contrary to Aristotle's understanding of friendship). For a response
to Sammons, see Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers as Strangers
and Friends: A Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L. REV. 69
(1995).
51. This hypothetical is taken from Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9,
at 1125-26. It is loosely based upon THOMAS SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND
A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 3-4 (1981).
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a baby. The client, a devout Christian with traditional views about
marriage, tells his lawyer to rewrite his will to exclude his son. The
lawyer, of course, could immediately redraft the will. But to do so
represents a cramped and unsatisfying vision of the lawyer's role
and the lawyer's relationship to her client. Instead, the lawyer
should encourage a full and frank dialogue about the change:
But if the lawyer knows her client well, and if she sees herself in
covenant with her client, then she understands that her responsi-
bilities go beyond the provision of technical legal assistance.
The lawyer recognizes that she and her client are in a relation-
ship in which they cannot help but influence each other. Like a
good friend, the lawyer cannot help but wonder if what her cli-
ent demands, in the heat of the moment, is really in her client's
best interests. Like a good friend, the lawyer will seek to engage
her client in a conversation about the proposed change.5 2
Some scholars have worried that the collaborative and friendship
models might be a cloak for subtle manipulation and domination
by the lawyer.53 Professor Jack Sammons objects to the friendship
model, doubting that lawyers and clients share sufficient common
moral values.5" Cochran admits, "There is a danger that a lawyer
who seeks to counsel one with different moral values may think
that she is engaging the client in moral discourse, when she is
merely imposing her values on the client."55
While this is an important objection, several points can be made
in reply. Cochran suggests several steps lawyers may take to re-
duce the risk of dominating their clients.56 First, the lawyer should
try to create an atmosphere that empowers the client and conveys a
sense of respect and moral equality.57 For example, a lawyer may
decide to discuss the issue of control openly with her client. Sec-
ond, the lawyer can adjust the "intensity" with which she ap-
proaches the relationship. Depending upon the issue and the
client, the lawyer may be more or less direct, more or less neutral,
in the language she uses and the emotions she displays.58 In some
cases the lawyer may decide to be relatively neutral on moral issues
by asking non-leading questions and displaying little emotion,
52. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1125.
53. See generally Sammons, supra note 50, at 38-42. But see COCHRAN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 182-87 (discussing ways to avoid lawyer domination of clients).
54. Sammons, supra note 50, at 8-27.
55. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 186.
56. Id. at 183-84.
57. Id. at 183.
58. Id. at 184.
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while in other cases the lawyer may take a more active role and
raise moral issues directly with her client.
Another protection against lawyer domination and overreaching
is for the lawyer to explain her approach to counseling at the outset
of the relationship. A client may assume her lawyer is ready to do
whatever the client wants, without raising moral questions or
doubts. To guard against any misunderstanding, the lawyer should
take the first available opportunity to sketch her vision of the law-
yer-client relationship. The lawyer need not use words like "col-
laborative model" or "covenantal relationship"; she need only
indicate by her words and actions that she hopes to foster a rela-
tionship marked by mutual trust and respect, one in which both
parties are free to openly raise moral questions. A client is free to
decline such a relationship if she would prefer a lawyer with a dif-
ferent, perhaps more subservient, view of the lawyer's role.
Two additional points should be added. First, lawyers and clients
often share a common moral tradition, or at least share enough
common moral values to make moral discourse possible. Many
people, regardless of their moral and religious differences, agree
that it is wrong to lie, cheat, or steal. Most adhere to some version
of the "Golden Rule"-we should treat others in the way we would
like to be treated.5 9 As Cochran and Shaffer insist:
Despite their diversity, North Americans are likely to share
moral values .... [S]ome of the moral values that are most
likely to be relevant in the law office - justice, mercy and truth-
fulness - are shared across many different religious and moral
traditions. This can be a starting point for addressing moral
issues.6°
Second, moral discourse is possible even if the lawyer and client
do not share a common moral tradition. There will probably be
some overlap of moral values. Even if there is little common moral
ground, lawyers and clients can still discuss moral issues while re-
specting their differences. The best discussions I have ever had
about moral and religious matters have not occurred while talking
59. LINDA K. TREVII;O & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS:
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT How To Do IT RIGHT 300 (2d ed. 1999) (finding some ver-
sion of the Golden Rule in Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam,
and Judaism).
60. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 41, at 49. Of course, a lawyer should not
assume that a client holds certain moral values merely because of the client's religious
affiliation. A lawyer who is Roman Catholic, for example, should not presume that a
client who is Roman Catholic will hold the same views as the lawyer does on issues
such as assisted reproduction or the removal of life-support.
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to those who shared my core values, but when talking to those who
held different values, thereby challenging me to think more seri-
ously about what I believe, and why. A lawyer can always en-
courage her clients to consider the moral dimensions of their
problems:
It does not violate client autonomy to ask, "Is that really what
you want to do?"; or to say, "Let's talk about this some more."
Instead of telling the client ... what he can do, the lawyer can
ask her client to reflect about what he should do. Sometimes
the lawyer need only speak a single word: Why? Why do you
say that? Why do you want to do that? This is the essence of
the lawyer's role as moral companion: to assume the best about
our clients, not the worst; to create a space for clients to think
before they act; and to help clients to act in accord with their
fundamental values.61
What have we learned from this comparison of the various mod-
els of the lawyer-client relationship? Ultimately, each lawyer must
decide for herself which model is best. The rules of professional
conduct certainly "permit a lawyer to choose among philosophies
of client counseling. ' 62 I believe, however, that the collaborative
or friendship model is preferable to the authoritarian model. It
avoids the twin temptations of lawyers dominating clients and cli-
ents dominating lawyers, preserves the moral equality of the par-
ties, is most likely to produce results more satisfying to the client,
and is the only one of the three models that encourages the lawyer
and client to discuss moral issues openly. Only under this model is
the lawyer free to raise moral questions and doubts with her client.
For all these reasons, lawyers should approach their clients as if
they were good friends who need help in making a decision.
Of course, there will be cases where the client will not be willing
or able to reciprocate. Some clients will have no interest in forging
a relationship of mutuality and equality, but the lawyer can ap-
proach clients with the collaborative or friendship model as a goal.
The lawyer can invite clients to enter into such a relationship by her
61. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1126 (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
62. Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking,
11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 43 (1997). The authoritarian model, however, may be
inconsistent with some of the basic values underlying the Model Rules. See supra text
accompanying note 17.
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words and actions. True friendship cannot be compelled-but it
can be nurtured and encouraged.63
II. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER'S RELIGION
Let us assume, for purposes of this Article, that lawyers should
strive to create a collaborative relationship with their clients. This
raises other questions: Assuming a collaborative relationship exists,
how much of a role is there for the lawyer's own religious values?
Should the lawyer be free to voice her religious doubts about a
case? How should a lawyer react if her client wants to do some-
thing that violates the lawyer's fundamental religious values?
Again, it may be helpful to begin with a hypothetical case, and
examine the various approaches available to the lawyer. Consider
a case in which a lawyer is assigned to represent a pregnant woman
who has been incarcerated. 64 The woman wants the lawyer to re-
quest bail for her so the client can obtain a legal abortion. The
attorney is strongly opposed to abortion on religious grounds, and
believes that abortion is always wrong and constitutes murder.
What are the lawyer's options, assuming the court will not allow
her to withdraw from the appointment?
One approach would be for the lawyer to adopt the authorita-
rian model and simply do what she thinks is right.65 She might
63. Although I endorse the collaborative model, it is not without its own
problems. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing and responding to
the criticism that the collaborative model can lead to lawyer domination of clients). In
my discussions with lawyers, the most common criticism of the collaborative model is
that it may be unduly time-consuming, and hence too expensive for clients (at least
for those clients paying on an hourly basis). There are at least four responses to this
criticism. First, the criticism may not be true. It is not certain, at least to me, that
treating clients respectfully and inviting moral reflection will necessarily increase the
time spent counseling clients. Second, even if the amount of time spent with clients
does increase, the extra time might be well worth it to clients because of the advan-
tages that flow from this model. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the advantages of the collaborative model over the authoritarian and client-
centered models). Third, as Cochran reminds us, "some clients come to lawyers for
short-term help in resolving a narrow issue." COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 6. In
these cases, the full-fledged collaborative model might not be necessary. A client
should be free to make an informed choice to have her lawyer make the decisions in
the case. Id. (arguing that a client can consent to give her lawyer control of decisions).
Fourth, a lawyer who adopts the collaborative model should explain her approach to
counseling at the outset and thereby give would-be clients the opportunity to choose
another lawyer instead.
64. This hypothetical is based upon Panel Discussion: Does Professionalism Leave
Room for Religious Commitment?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875, 891 (1999).
65. See supra notes 5-22 and accompanying text (discussing the authoritarian
model).
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keep secret her objections to abortion, procrastinating until it is too
late for the client to obtain an abortion. Alternatively, she might
give less than candid advice and mislead her client into believing
that bail is not obtainable, or that an abortion is not possible under
the circumstances.
This approach is unethical and immoral. It violates the rules of
professional conduct governing the profession.66 It may constitute
legal malpractice, 67 and may constitute an intentional tort. By uni-
laterally usurping control of the relationship, the lawyer has vio-
lated the client's autonomy. The case is now being conducted not
to benefit the client, but to benefit the lawyer's unspoken interests.
As Professor Bruce Green argues:
In general, a client seeks the lawyer's advice in order to be able
to make an informed decision. Advice that undermines the cli-
ent's ability to make an informed decision - because the advice
is coercive, false, incomplete, or so offensive as to undermine
the client's trust in the lawyer - thus may be contrary to applica-
ble professional norms.
For these reasons ... it would be improper for a lawyer to rec-
ommend a course of conduct when the lawyer's motivation is to
promote the lawyer's unexpressed personal views.68
Perhaps this case is too easy. Few lawyers or ethicists would ar-
gue that this lawyer acted properly. Consider a second possibility,
where the lawyer decides that her task-her only task-is to deter-
mine what her client wants, and do whatever she can to achieve her
client's objective. Her own views on abortion are irrelevant, and so
she keeps her moral and religious doubts to herself. In effect, the
lawyer adopts the client-centered model discussed earlier.69
This lawyer violates no rule of professional conduct. She com-
mits no legal malpractice. But is this the best course of action for
her client and herself? At first glance, she seems to be acting as a
good lawyer. The client, of course, has the ultimate authority over
66. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 (1983) (requiring a lawyer to
provide competent representation); id. R. 1.2(a) (stating that decisions about the
objectives of a case are for the client to make); id. R. 1.2(c) (stating that a lawyer may
limit the objectives of a case only if the client consents); id. R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer
to act diligently and promptly); id. R. 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasona-
bly informed and to explain matters sufficiently to allow the client to make informed
decisions).
67. Panel Discussion, supra note 64, at 893 (remarks of participants).
68. Green, supra note 62, at 44 (emphasis added).
69. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text (discussing the client-centered
model).
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the ends of the representation. 70 The lawyer's job is to help her
client make a decision and take the necessary steps to implement
that decision. The lawyer should not try to manipulate the client or
control her decision. As Binder says, "Because client autonomy is
of paramount importance, decisions should be made on the basis of
what choice is most likely to provide a client with maximum satis-
faction. 71 Of course, the lawyer has an important role to play in
helping the client clarify objectives, identify alternative courses of
conduct, and assess the likely costs and benefits of each alterna-
tive.72 However, the lawyer must remain neutral and impartial at
all costs.7 3 The lawyer's religious values and doubts seem to have
no place in a client-centered approach.
This does not mean that a lawyer must always accept a client's
choices at face value. 74 As Anthony Kronman states, even if a cli-
ent seems adamant in her choice, the lawyer should make certain
that the client's choice is not "impetuous" :75
Most lawyers would agree, I think, that under these circum-
stances it would be irresponsible simply to do what the client
asks without first assuring oneself that his decision is a well-con-
sidered one .... It may not always be clear that the client's
decision is impetuous, but when surrounding circumstances sug-
gest that it is, a responsible lawyer will test his client's judge-
ment [sic] before accepting it, recognizing that in such situations
the danger of regret is large and that a lawyer must protect his
client from this familiar species of self-inflicted harm as well as
the harm caused by others.76
But how can the lawyer ensure that a client's decision is well
considered? Kronman cautions against evaluating a client's
choices on the basis of the lawyer's own values:
It would be inappropriate for the lawyer to conduct this inquiry
from the perspective of his own personal desires by asking
whether he would want to do what the client has proposed, and
to conclude that the client's decision is impetuous if the lawyer
would not have made it for himself.77
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
71. BINDER & PRICE, supra note 24, at 261.
72. Id. at 289-308.
73. Id. at 289.
74. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 179 (quoting KRONMAN, supra note 43,
at 129-32).
75. KRONMAN, supra note 43, at 129.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 130.
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Instead, the lawyer should try to enter the client's world. The
lawyer should "place himself in the client's position by provision-
ally accepting his ends and then imaginatively considering the con-
sequences of pursuing them. "78
While there is much good in this approach, it has serious
problems as well. As a practical matter, we may question whether
the kind of neutrality envisioned by the client-centered model is
even possible in a case where a lawyer has deeply-felt religious mis-
givings about a client's course of conduct. If a lawyer believes for
religious reasons that her client is making a bad decision-in our
hypothetical case, that her client is going to commit murder by hav-
ing an abortion-then it may be too much to ask the lawyer to put
aside her own values and accept the client's ends as if they were
her own. It is more likely that the lawyer's moral and religious
doubts will influence the way she identifies the various options
open to the client and assesses the likely consequences of each.
Process can control substance: lawyers know that how you present
alternatives will often determine which alternative the client
chooses. For example, if a lawyer believes that removal of life-sup-
ports from a comatose patient is murder, this belief can shape how
the lawyer approaches the case, explains the law to her client, and
evaluates the pros and cons of each option. A lawyer's conscious
or unconscious moral and religious misgivings do not disappear
merely because the lawyer decides to keep them to herself.
In such cases the lawyer may continue with the representation,
yet be plagued by nagging doubts or a vague sense of guilt or anxi-
ety. As I have argued elsewhere, "If ... a lawyer refuses to voice
her moral doubts, those doubts do not disappear. Her moral mis-
givings go underground and fester, contaminating and subverting
her dealings with her client."7 9 This may lead to resentment and
hostility toward the client, or even to a sense of self-loathing.8 0 It
may also help to explain the paternalism and manipulation that
lawyers often engage in towards clients. When a lawyer feels re-
sentment or anger towards a client, these feelings might lead the
lawyer to treat the client "more like an object than a human being,
and more like a child than an adult." 81
78. Id.
79. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1127.
80. See Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay On
George Orwell and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 12
(1993) [hereinafter Allegretti, Serving Clients].
81. Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 19.
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Another problem with this approach lies in its single-minded de-
votion to the client's autonomy.8 2 Client autonomy, while certainly
important, is not the only value that deserves to be honored in the
lawyer-client relationship. There are at least two other parties
whose interests should be considered: other persons and groups
that may be affected by the client's choices, and the lawyer her-
self.83 A lawyer does both of these parties a disservice if she brack-
ets or ignores her religious doubts about a case.
Talk of client autonomy runs the risk of abstracting the client
from the relationships and communities that nurture and sustain us
all. "In the beginning is relation," says philosopher Martin
Buber.84 Life is essentially social-we are shaped and formed by
our relationships with others. Theologian Richard McCormick
states that, "[O]ur well-being is interdependent. It cannot be con-
ceived of or realistically pursued independently of the good of
others. Sociality is part of our being and becoming. ' 85 Some
thinkers have gone so far as to claim that human beings exist only
in relationships. There can be no sense of "I" except in relation to
others.86
This means that we are never truly autonomous. As legal
ethicist Thomas Morgan says, "We were born into families and nur-
tured by communities. As a result, we owe obligations to those
individuals and groups, as well as to the broader society. ' 87 This
understanding leads Morgan to argue that a "lawyer should refuse
to engage in conduct when the resulting harm to third parties will
be more than is necessary to further the client's legitimate
concerns."
88
We may raise questions about the scope and desirability of Mor-
gan's standard.89 Nevertheless, Morgan has put his finger on a ba-
sic truth that has important implications for client counseling. A
client does not live in moral isolation. The client's obligations to
82. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
83. There are also questions about the client's and lawyer's obligations to the sys-
tem of justice itself, but these are beyond the scope of this article.
84. MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 18 (2d ed. 1958).
85. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADI-
TION: TRADITION IN TRANSITION 55 (1984).
86. BRUCE C. BIRCH & LARRY L. RASMUSSEN, BIBLE & ETHICS IN THE CHRIS-
TIAN LIFE 69 (revised & expanded ed. 1989).
87. Morgan, supra note 41, at 447.
88. Id. at 454.
89. How, for example, is the lawyer to balance the harm done to third parties
against the legitimate goals of a client? How would such a principle be enforced?
Could such a standard prove workable in the courtroom?
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other parties are a legitimate topic of discussion. Indeed, a law-
yer's religious doubts about a case will often derive from her con-
cerns about the possibility of harm to third parties. The lawyer
should be free to discuss her doubts and concerns with the client or
else the client may never consider the impact of her decision on
others. For example, in our abortion hypothetical, the lawyer's re-
ligious objections are rooted in her beliefs about the harm being
done to the client's unborn child. If the lawyer adopts an unduly
narrow view of her role and does not voice her doubts, the issue of
the client's duties to the fetus may never be considered.
Paul Zwier and Ann Hamric have expressed similar arguments,
proposing that lawyers adopt an "ethic of care" when counseling
clients.9" Under their approach, the lawyer would not focus solely
on the client's lawful interests, but would also facilitate a discussion
about the likely impact of various alternatives on the other persons
who will be affected by the client's decision. The lawyer and client
should "think through all possible alternative activities to deter-
mine which are responsible (i.e., loving and just) to those who are
involved in the situation." 91 Similarly, one of the reasons Cochran
prefers the collaborative model to the client-centered model is that
the former encourages discussion about the interests of other par-
ties, while the latter focuses solely on the client's interests. 92
This is not to say that the lawyer in our hypothetical should lec-
ture the client about her religious objections to abortion. Nor am I
proposing that the lawyer should mislead the client about her legal
options, or present those options in a way that favors whatever al-
ternative the lawyer thinks is best. I am not saying that the lawyer
and client must engage in theological and philosophical arguments
about the meaning of personhood or the sanctity of life. I am cer-
tainly not saying that the lawyer should "testify" about her own
religious values, or try to evangelize her client.93 In fact, lawyers
should be extremely reluctant to use explicitly theological language
with clients, for doing so will often convey both a lack of respect
90. See Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care and Reimagining the
Lawyer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383, 383-86 (1996).
91. Id. at 402.
92. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 177.
93. See Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer In A Pluralist Society, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1469, 1497 (1998) ("For a religious lawyer simply to 'testify' to the
strength of his or her convictions would be a grievous wrong, for it would fail to
address the client as a concrete human being and moral agent.").
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for the client's own views, and a failure to recognize the client's
vulnerability.94
Rather, I am saying that a lawyer owes it to her client to give the
client an opportunity to reflect about the moral aspects of a case.
A lawyer does not do her client a disservice when she provides the
client an opportunity to think about these matters. Further, a law-
yer who has religious objections to a client's cause need not keep
silent about her misgivings, but should feel free to raise them in an
appropriate, non-paternalistic manner.
I agree with Professor Russell Pearce who, when commenting
upon the hypothetical of the lawyer whose incarcerated client
seeks bail to obtain an abortion, wrote, "I would have no problem
with the lawyer having a conversation with the client where the
lawyer brings his or her moral concerns into the conversation. ''95
How and when to raise such concerns is another matter. As Pro-
fessor Lesnick notes, "The challenge to the attorney is to integrate
strong conviction with a lively awareness that in a pluralist society
even the strongest conviction is personal, and that the manner of
counseling must reflect the realities of a client's vulnerabilities." 96
In our hypothetical case, the lawyer must take great pains to
avoid manipulating and controlling her client, especially since the
client is incarcerated, and might reasonably believe that her lawyer
holds the keys to her freedom. Under such circumstances, the law-
yer should take all steps to ensure she does not impose her own
values upon the client. As suggested earlier, a lawyer can invite
moral reflection without dominating a client by asking questions
such as: "Why? Why do you want to do this? Are you sure you
want to do this? Can we talk about this some more?" 97
Now we can see more clearly why it is important for the lawyer
to try to create an atmosphere marked by trust and collaboration.
"It is possible to discuss moral issues openly and frankly with a
client, without falling into the trap of lawyer domination or client
domination, but only if there already exists a relationship of mutual
94. See Green, supra note 62, at 46-47.
A lawyer-client relationship is not conducive to the kind of theological dia-
logue that might be necessary to convince [a client] of the appropriateness of
[the lawyer's] theological views and, in any case, it would be abusive to use
the representation as an occasion for an uninvited discussion of religion.
Id.
95. Panel Discussion, supra note 64, at 892.
96. Lesnick, supra note 93, at 1496-97.
97. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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respect and trust. ' 98 If a friend of mine proposes to do something
that I believe is wrong or immoral, she might be willing to discuss
her decision with me, because she trusts me to provide her with
guidance without being overbearing or controlling. She knows that
I want only the best for her. But she is unlikely to listen to a stran-
ger, because there is no relationship of friendship and trust to fall
back on. That is why the kind of full and frank discussion I envi-
sion presupposes Cochran's collaborative approach, 99 or what I
prefer to call a covenantal relationship.1
00
Allowing lawyers the freedom to discuss their moral and relig-
ious values is also good for the client. In order for the client to
choose wisely, she needs to consider the full range of factors rele-
vant to her decision, including the moral aspects. Since clients
often take their cues from their lawyers, a lawyer's unwillingness to
raise moral issues often means that such issues will not be raised at
all.10 1 A refusal to discuss moral issues, of course, speaks loudly
about the irrelevance of moral discourse.0 2
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit, even if they
do not require, a lawyer to raise moral issues with her client. The
Model Rules provide, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exer-
cise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.
In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation."' 1 3 The Model Rules
recognize that a failure to explore moral issues can detract from
the quality of the lawyer's representation. As a comment to the
above rule explains:
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to
a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost
or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical
legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is
proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical consid-
98. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1126 n.167.
99. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 6-9, 176-82.
100. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1116-29; see supra text ac-
companying note 48.
101. See Allegretti, Serving Clients, supra note 80, at 17-23 (discussing the "conspir-
acy of silence" between lawyers and clients, which often leads to a failure of either
party to discuss moral questions).
102. Jack Sammons has noted that, "[N]ot raising morality shapes the client's mo-
rality. You cannot avoid the moral issue. It is like politics in that regard. Not to be
political is one form of being political. Not to raise morality is one way of making a
moral statement." JACK L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 28-29 (1988).
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
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erations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advi-
sor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be
applied. °4
I would go further and suggest that in many cases a lawyer can-
not adequately represent a client if the lawyer brackets or ignores
her own moral and religious values. A lawyer, after all, is someone
who speaks for someone else.'0 5 But a lawyer cannot speak effec-
tively and persuasively for a client if the lawyer ignores either her
client's moral values or her own. Gerard Postema puts it well:
Both positivist and natural law theorists agree that moral argu-
ments have an important place in the determination of much of
modern law. But the lawyer who must detach professional judg-
ment from his own moral judgment is deprived of the resources
from which arguments regarding his client's legal rights and du-
ties can be fashioned. 10 6
A lawyer's refusal to explore moral issues with her clients dimin-
ishes the quality of the representation. 10 7
The lawyer suffers as well if she brackets or ignores her moral
and religious values. She ceases to be a moral agent, and instead
becomes little more than the client's hired gun.108 The client's ends
become the boundaries of the lawyer's moral universe. When this
happens, the lawyer has no reason to consider the impact of her
decisions-and her client's decisions-on third parties and society
at large. She is unlikely to raise issues of care, compassion, and
reconciliation. 10 9
In effect, such a lawyer splits her life in two and lives what I call
a "compartmentalized life." 110 Her moral and religious values-
those core values that sustain the rest of her life-are deemed off-
limits at work. The result is a kind of moral schizophrenia. When
104. Id. R. 2.1. cmt. [2].
105. See Sammons, supra note 50, at 43-58 (arguing that a lawyer is best viewed as a
rhetorician).
106. Gerard J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 79 (1980).
107. As mentioned earlier, there is some evidence that clients are happier with
their lawyers' work and more satisfied with the outcomes when they have been
treated as equal partners in the relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
108. See Allegretti, Hired Gun, supra note 33, at 774-75.
109. See Joseph Allegretti, Rights, Roles, Relationships: The Wisdom of Solomon
and the Ethics of Lawyers, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1119, 1134-36 (1992) (examining
the role that caring, compassion, and relationships should play in the practice of law)
[hereinafter Allegretti, Rights, Roles, Relationships].
110. ALLEGRETri, supra note 32, at 15-17.
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she is away from the office, the lawyer is presumably a good and
decent person who tries not to lie, cheat, or be mean-spirited.
However, when she is at work she feels "compelled to leave [her]
religious values at the door . . . . There the dog-eat-dog mentality
or the I'm-only-following-the-rules excuse holds sway."' 1 Not sur-
prisingly, a morally schizophrenic life is inherently unstable. Stud-
ies suggest that if a lawyer takes positions at odds with her personal
values, over time her personal values will change to conform to her
public behavior." 2
For all these reasons, lawyers should be free to bring their moral
and religious values with them into the practice of law. They
should be free to discuss moral issues and religious doubts with
their clients in ways that respect the dignity and autonomy of cli-
ents. Lawyers need not shed their religious values in order to prac-
tice law.
One final point should be considered. Let us assume that a full
and frank discussion of moral issues has taken place. The lawyer's
moral and religious doubts have been raised and explored. In the
end, however, important decisions such as whether to sue or to set-
tle are for the client to decide. 13 What is likely to happen now that
the lawyer has discussed her moral and religious doubts with her
client?
One possibility is that the client's views will change. After dis-
cussing the matter with a trusted advisor, the client may decide
against what she was previously considering. In our abortion hypo-
thetical, the client might decide that she does not really want to
have an abortion.
Another possibility, of course, is that the parties will explore the
issue fully without reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement. In
our hypothetical, the parties may discuss the morality of abortion,
yet come to no agreement. The client may still want to obtain the
abortion; the lawyer may still feel that she cannot help the client do
so without violating her own deeply held religious values. Under
these circumstances, the lawyer may have no choice but to refuse
to assist the client. This freedom to say "no" is a necessary element
in any relationship between moral equals. It is part of any true
friendship. "This too is part of the lawyer's duty towards her client.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers From Their Profession: Redefining
the Lawyer's Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32 (1980).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983); see supra note 17 and ac-
companying text.
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To be willing to say, after discussing a matter fully, 'I will not do
this. I cannot do what you ask." 114
Under these circumstances, the lawyer should withdraw from the
case." 5 Courts should be sensitive to moral and religious objec-
tions by lawyers, and should be willing to allow withdrawals in such
cases.1 16 In our hypothetical, the lawyer should be allowed to with-
draw from the appointment if, after discussing the matter fully with
her client, the client remains committed to obtaining the abortion,
and the lawyer remains opposed for sincere religious reasons117
There is a third possibility, however, which should not be over-
looked: Perhaps the lawyer will change. Perhaps the lawyer's
moral doubts will be dispelled as he listens to his client tell his
story. Perhaps the lawyer will come to understand more fully
what motivates his client, appreciate and accept the client's
objectives, and continue as the client's companion and
lawyer. 18
114. Allegretti, Religious Perspective, supra note 9, at 1127.
115. The Model Rules require a lawyer to withdraw from a representation if "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1). The Model Rules permit a
lawyer to withdraw from a case if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," or if there is "other good cause." Id. R.
1.16(b)(3), (b)(6). Withdrawal is subject to court approval. Id. R. 1.16(c). In our hypo-
thetical, withdrawal is not required, but may certainly be permitted. Lawyers should
not be too quick to seek withdrawal for religious reasons, but should do so only after
fully discussing the issue with their clients, and only when their religious objections
are strong and sincere.
116. See Lesnick, supra note 93, at 1494 (discussing and criticizing a decision of the
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which held
that a lawyer who had strong religious objections to abortion could not decline an
appointment to represent a minor who was seeking an abortion without parental con-
sent pursuant to state law); see also Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of
Tenn., Formal Op. 96-F-140 (1996).
117. Under the Model Rules, a lawyer should not try to avoid a court appointment
except for "good cause." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2. "Good cause"
includes cases where:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct or other law; (b) representing the client is likely to result
in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or (c) the client or the
cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.
Id. Our hypothetical case seems to fit squarely within (c). But see Lesnick, supra note
93, at 1494.
118. ALLEGRETTI, supra note 32, at 46.
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Whatever the result, it is better for a lawyer and client to discuss
moral issues than avoid them.aa9 It is better for a lawyer to voice
her concerns and invite moral dialogue than to bracket or ignore
her moral and religious values. A lawyer can bring her moral and
religious values with her into the workplace-as long as she re-
members that she is neither her client's boss, nor her client's hired
gun, but rather her client's companion, her client's partner, and
even, at times, her client's friend.
119. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 41, at 28-29 (arguing that it is beneficial
for lawyers and clients to discuss moral issues, even if the lawyer ultimately decides to
end the representation).
